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The Bush Administration appears set for a showdown with Iraq. And, as was the case with the Clinton 
Administration's Iraq policy over the last eight years, the United Nations-imposed disarmament regime will 
likely be the centerpiece of a future crisis. The emerging "Bush Doctrine," which commits the country to 
combating terrorist groups and countries that support terrorism, also incorporates the idea that "rogue" 
nations should not be allowed to develop weapons of mass destruction that could potentially threaten the 
United States and its allies. While President Bush's State of the Union address identified the "axis of evil" 
-- Iran, Iraq and North Korea -- as particularly troubling countries needing attention under this doctrine, it 
seems clear that Iraq with its unmonitored WMD programs is the prime target.  
The U.S.-Iraq arms inspection/WMD standoff represents a defining characteristic of the post-Gulf War 
environment in the region, not to mention the interaction within the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) during this period. Simply put, Iraq's commitments to the international community under United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and follow-on resolutions remain unfulfilled. These resolutions 
require that Iraq destroy all its WMD programs (weapons, production equipment and research programs) 
and submit to a U.N.-administered long-term WMD monitoring system. The United States and the Britain 
are effectively the only permanent members of the Security Council that continue to insist that Iraq live up 
to these obligations. While the Clinton Administration did not shy away from using force against Iraq to 
back up the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, it decided for a variety of reasons against an 
invasion to enforce the will of the international community as expressed in the Security Council's 
resolutions. In the context of more current events, traditional allies such as Britain and Canada have 
registered their support for the U.S. stance and possible military action, while Iraq's friends in the Security 
Council, Russia, France, and China, are simply calling on Iraq to let inspectors back in. Neither Russia, 
France, nor China appears to support an invasion of Iraq.  
For its part, the U.N. Secretariat is currently playing messenger and negotiator for the international 
community. On March 7, Director General Kofi Annan held talks with high-level Iraq officials to urge the 
country accept the return of U.N. weapons inspectors. According to Mr. Annan, "the question of the 
inspectors and return of the inspectors has been one of the key bones of contention between the United 
Nations and Iraq," expressing hope that Iraq will work in a "constructive spirit." Even if these talks are 
successful, questions remain, such as, what will U.N. inspectors do when they they get there, what might 
they find, and what may be the outcome if evidence of continued Iraqi WMD efforts is uncovered?  
Inspections Now? 
In December 1999 the U.N. established a follow-on inspection regime in the form of the Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to continue UNSCOM's work. It has not begun its 
inspections due to Iraq's refusal to permit their inspections until sanctions are lifted.  
Despite significant and well-documented accomplishments, UNSCOM arguably faced insurmountable 
problems in fulfilling its mandate. It remains unclear whether UNMOVIC could be any more successful 
given the fundamentally non-permissive arms control environment under which the mission is being 
undertaken. The inspections in Iraq are and have always been based on an assumptive disconnect. The 
international community broadly assumes that Iraq intends to honor its obligations under the cease-fire 
agreement; Iraq, for its part, has no intention of meeting these obligations and, as a result, has 
successfully pursued a strategy of obstruction and concealment. As chronicled in the recent testimony of 
former UNSCOM Deputy Director Charles Duelfer, Iraq's WMD programs are seen by the regime as 
central to its survival.1 Indeed, as noted by Duelfer, the regime believes that WMD actually saved the 
country during Iran-Iraq War, and, similarly, deterred the United States from marching on Baghdad after 
ejecting Iraq's forces from Kuwait. Hence, Duelfer convincingly argues, the programs will never be 
revealed to any international body. With this as a backdrop, UNSCOM's accomplishments are all the 
more impressive. The enduring nature of the regime's commitment to concealment and noncompliance 
make UNMOVIC's arms control mission just as difficult as UNSCOM's. 
Iraq's readmission of weapons inspectors could lead to two outcomes: (1) Inspectors being denied access 
to suspected WMD sites and otherwise obstructed, leading UNMOVIC to report continued noncompliance; 
(2) Actual progress in narrowing the gaps between Iraq's declarations as to the state of its WMD 
programs and the ability of UNMOVIC to verify these declarations. An important issue under UNMOVIC's 
leadership is the "reasonableness" standard under which any progress in the three files (missile, chemical, 
biological) will be judged. Throughout the UNSCOM era, the United States insisted on strict and verifiable 
accounting standards; the fear is that UNMOVIC may not share this commitment and will be more prone 
to political influence from the Secretariat, which is anxious to settle the issue.  
Suspected remaining WMD capabilities? 
Although the Gulf War, UNSCOM activities, and internal destruction activities have left Iraq with 
considerably less then their original WMD capability, experts believe that Saddam still has a significant 
infrastructure in all areas with the exception of nuclear weapons development: 
• Nuclear weapons -- Western intelligence reports that Iraq has probably continued at least low-
level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material 
remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. Western 
intelligence believes that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in 
reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.  
• Missiles -- It is probable that a small force of SCUD-derived missiles remain in Iraq. Defectors 
have reported their existence and this is consistent with the remaining uncertainties of 
UNSCOM's work. During UNSCOM's presence, Iraq maintained programs to develop short-range 
ballistic and multi-stage missiles. They even built a facility for the production of ammonium 
perchlorate, a key ingredient in solid missile propellant. It is reasonable to assume that such 
development work continues. Key indicators will be testing of separating warheads, fusing for 
detonation above ground, and perhaps employment of supersonic parachutes to retard warheads. 
Coupled with known Iraqi interest in these areas before UNSCOM left, such testing would 
indicate important advances in Iraqi CW and BW missile warheads.  
• Chemical weapons -- The Iraqi chemical weapons program must be assumed to remain albeit in 
a diminished state from the huge industrial production of the 1980's. Dual-use facilities, even at 
known locations such as the production plants at Falluja, have the ability to produce chemical 
agents clandestinely. Chemical weapons have proven utility to Iraq on the battlefield against large 
troop concentrations. Iraq will retain the capacity to produce significant amounts of agent and fill 
munitions in a period of strategic warning. Storable, persistent VX agent may well have been 
produced since UNSCOM left in 1998. CW munitions for the battlefield can be produced in 
existing Iraqi munitions factories.  
• Biological weapons -- The biological program is the most problematic for a number of reasons. It 
most certainly is the most difficult present threat posed by Iraq. First, it is the least visible. 
Facilities can be hidden or made mobile. BW programs have a small signature. Another key 
concern about the biological programs is that Iraq can accomplish everything indigenously. They 
can produce all the production equipment (fermenters, dryers, centrifuges, etc.). Iraq is also quite 
able to produce dispersal weapons of various sorts. Finally, they may also have access to seed 
stocks for a range of agents. They also have the capacity to deploy it clandestinely or through 
surrogates should the regime so decide.  
UNMOVIC's Task  
Hans Blix, the Chief U.N. inspector, says that any searches in Iraq will have to be tough, viable and not 
"cosmetic." The U.N. Security Council has empowered his organization to look anywhere and destroy 
Iraq's most lethal weapons. Preparing for the eventual moment when his inspectors would enter Iraq, 
UNMOVIC has assembled a list of tasks in a 300-page notebook with over 100 unresolved issues. These 
include identifying any remaining long-range missiles, clarifying the physical existence of any nuclear or 
missile infrastructure, verifying the destruction of numerous biological agents (to include over 8,500 liters 
of declared anthrax agent), and ensuring that programs have not been re-constituted. However, the U.N. 
Security Council has also mandated UNMOVIC to complete their work quickly, and to tread softly, with 
cultural sensitivity. Mr. Blix's mandate gives him 60 days after starting work in Iraq to come up with a 
shortlist of target weapons and facilities and a set of "clearly defined and precise" tasks that Iraq must 
fulfill to prove that it is disarming. 
Conclusion  
The Bush Administration appears determined to force a resolution to the arms control-inspection 
conundrum in Iraq. Given Iraq's commitments to its WMD programs, many believe that regime change is 
the only way to enforce compliance.2 Iraq is pushing back diplomatically, which could be seen as a stall 
tactic, asking the UNSC to answer a list of questions before they consider letting inspectors back into the 
country. The Secretary General asked the council to answer questions including whether U.S. threats 
against the Iraqi government were a breach of international law, whether U.S. spies would serve on 
inspection teams, whether there would be compensation for prior U.S. and British bombings, and how 
long inspectors would stay if Baghdad eventually let them in. One question was already answered by 
Hans Blix. He told the Security Council that it would take less than a year for his teams to complete 
inspections.  
America's response to Iraq's questions is unreservedly negative. Robert Wood, spokesman for the U.S. 
mission to the U.N. called the questions an attempt "to portray Iraq as a victim." The United States is 
adament that the UNSC should not answer the questions but rather focus on Iraq's obligation to permit 
full inspections. And the United States is not likely to be patient during this process. If it comes to it, acting 
unilaterally in Iraq will carry political costs for the United States within the United Nations and the Security 
Council, and it could complicate the war on terrorism. The U.S.-Iraq-UNSC standoff has been an enduring 
feature of the international landscape throughout the 1990s. Altering or removing this phenomenon will 
create ripple effects across the region and throughout the international community. We cannot foresee all 
the consequences of such a development, but we can say with certainty that the world would be a 
different place with a disarmed Iraq. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East Resources and  
our WMD Proliferation Resources. 
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